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1. Introduction
Jane Austen (1775–1817) has written six novels which are mainly concerned
with young adults searching for a suitable partner in marriage. Michael Suk-
Young Chwe, a renowned economist and political scientist working at the Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles, has written a book about Austen’s novels. In
Chwe’s words: “For Austen, choice is a central concern, even obsession. The sin-
gle most important choice is a woman’s choice of whether and whom to marry
[...].” (97)1 Chwe presents an insightful analysis of these novels in terms of
choice, preferences, emotions, manipulation, status, empathy...
Chwe argues forcefully and convincingly that game theorists can learn a lot
from reading Austen: “[E]xploring strategic thinking, theoretically and not just
for practical advantage, is Austen’s explicit intention. Austen is a theoretician of
strategic thinking, in her own words, an ‘imaginist’. Austen’s novels do not sim-
ply provide ‘case material’ for the game theorist to analyze, but are themselves
an ambitious theoretical project, with insights not yet superseded by modern
social science.” (1) These are surely bold claims. And Chwe is serious about the
title of his book: Jane Austen, game theorist.
2. Michael Chwe, Game Theorist
We will discuss later whether Jane Austen should be considered a game the-
orist. It is clear, however, that Michael Chwe is a skillful presenter of game
theory. For example, Chwe (19f.) illustrates the stag-hunt game (to employ the
term normally used in game-theory books) with Shakespeare’s “Much Ado about
Nothing” and Richard Wright’s autobiography “Black Boy”. We also like how
Chwe introduces backward induction. He does not start with the full tree and
identiﬁes subtrees later. Instead, he starts with the (two) subtrees and explains
the best decisions to be taken in these trees. “But which of these two situations
1 All quotations without an explicit author refer to Chwe’s book. This holds also for Austen’s novels
where different editions show different pagination.174 Katharina Lotzen and Harald Wiese
takes place is up to” (12) the agent who moves ﬁrst. In a similar procedure he
builds a Bayesian tree (in mind, not graphically) when solving the “Flossie and
the Fox” game (43f.).
Michael Chwe also takes Austen’s novels as a suitable occasion to defend
game theory against unwarranted criticism or imagined limitations. For exam-
ple, game theory is certainly not a capitalist undertaking (26f.). Nor does payoff
maximization imply anyhing about whether the person modeled is “expressive
or instrumental, altruistic or selﬁsh, cruel or kind” (25). In chapter 8, he shows
that Austen would also not subscribe to a limited view of strategic thinking.
3. Jane Austen’s Understanding of Common Economic
Terms
Chwe reads Austen’s novels with an economic mind, always identifying pas-
sages that can be interpreted by using terms like opportunity cost, preferences,
revealed preferences and the like. Austen apparently has quite clear notions
about
• preferences:
Austen discusses how preferences are formed and how they evolve. Econo-
mists normally work with given preferences that are complete. The de-
cision problem is already solved in such a setting. Austen is much more
realistic in dealing with contradictory reasons to choose one action rather
than another. Chwe observes Austen’s assumption that pros and cons
can be weighed against each other. He uses the word “commensurabil-
ity” (102f.) which is another and rather nice expression for completeness.
Indeed, whenever you can weigh an advantage against a disadvantage in
another sphere, you can come to a ﬁnal conclusion, i.e., you have complete
preferences.
Over time, preferences may evolve in one direction or another. Chwe
identiﬁes how these changes may come about in Austen’s characters
(158f.): by gratitutude, fear of death, love, changing reference points, ﬂat-
tery, and others.
• revealed preferences:
Chwe presents a convincing example for revealed preferences from Pride
and Prejudice. Jane is reluctant to enter into a marriage with Mr. Bing-
ley because she knows his sisters to be against it. Jane’s sister Elizabeth
clearly employs revealed preferences by saying: “[I]f upon mature deliber-
ation, you ﬁnd that the misery of disobliging his two sisters is more than
equivalent to the happiness of being his wife, I advise you by all means to
refuse him.” (105)
• feasible sets:
On one level, the feasible sets are clear. For women, the feasible set con-
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most important that men and women have chances to meet. Chwe shows
which tricks are used by Austen’s characters to make these meetings hap-
pen or to prevent them.
• opportunity cost and thinking in alternatives:
This idea is put very nicely in Emma (101): “We must consider what Miss
Fairfax quits, before we condemn her taste for what she goes to.” Opportu-
nity cost can also refer to contingencies. For example, Henry Tilney (NA,
217) says that “our pleasures in this world are always to be paid for, and
that we often purchase them at a great disadvantage, giving ready-monied
actual happiness for a draft on the future, that may not be honoured”.
For Chwe, the interesting point is that Henry “equates happiness with
money”. True, but the other huge point is that Henry (and Austen) had an
idea about expected payoffs.
4. Jane Austen, Innovator
Chwe exhibits a very open mind by readily accepting Austen’s teaching of strate-
gic matters. Chwe mentions ﬁve innovations (advances in game theory), four in
chapter 9 and one in chapter 12. Let us mention three of them.
1. Austen often describes how two people join forces to manipulate a third
one. For example, Emma ﬁgures “how fundamental strategic partnership
is to her idea of marriage” (143).
2. Chwe reads some passages as foreshadowing modern analyses of multiple-
self approaches in decision theory.
3. Austen’s most fundamental innovation, according to Chwe and using his
term, is “cluelessness”. Chwe does not only demonstrate how strategic stu-
pidity shows up in her characters, but also provides modern-day examples.
5. Jane Austen, Game Theorist?
Is Jane Austen a game theorist? Of course, the British novellist covers many
subjects that can be rephrased in terms of choices, preferences and revealed
prefrences (see chapter 6 in Chwe’s book). However, this does not show that
Austen is a game theorist. It is the other way around: Game theory’s central
concepts are well chosen and relate to everyday life and literature in a helpful
manner.
If Austen were a game theorist, she would have had some notions of a strat-
egy or an equilibrium. The current reviewers think that she had none of these.
This is clear from Chwe’s section about “Names for Strategic Thinking” (chap-
ter 6) such as penetration, foresight, sagacity, engaging in schemes or meddling.
Also, to the mind of the reviewers, Austen was not even close to predate Cournot
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It can certainly be admitted that Austen may well have had some informal
model of a game tree in mind (see, for example, Chwe’s discussion of Fanny’s
present of a knife to her sister in chapter 2). This, of course, does not prove a
lot about Austen’s status as a game theorist. After all, informal notions of game
trees and even of backward induction, are not a modern achievement (see, for
example, Wiese 2012). Here, it is interesting to note that Austen makes Henry
Tilney say: “[I]n both, man has the advantage of choice, woman only the power of
refusal.” (70) From this and other passages, Chwe draws the (presumably) cor-
rect conclusion that “to make a choice is almost always a good thing for Austen”
(98). According to Austen, men (who are the ﬁrst movers) enjoy an advantage
over women (who are second movers). Of course, a game theorist (armed with
game trees) could easily and proﬁtably discuss whether or not a ﬁrst-mover ad-
vantage exists.
In most parts of the book, Chwe is quite explicit about “Jane Austen, game
theorist”. He even considers her novels “game theory textbooks” (183). How-
ever, Chwe is more cautious a few pages above: “Regardless of whether Austen
intends to impart game theory in her novels, it is up to the reader to receive it.”
(180)
To our mind, Jane Austen is not a game theorist, she is a strategist. This is
not meant to belittle her contribution to economic thinking. Indeed, game theory
is just an important and useful tool to develop strategic thinking. At the same
time, there are important aspects of strategizing that have not been considered
by game theory for different reasons. The innovator Austen may still give future
game theorists food for thought.
Of course, Chwe himself may have been a good strategist when choosing the
slightly incorrect, but catchy title of his book. In Austen’s words, Chwe engages
in a cunning and artful scheme exhibiting penetration and sagacity (107f.).
6. Minor Criticism
We liked Chwe’s book a lot and have only some minor critical points:
• It is not quite clear why “Flossie and the Fox” or Shakespeare’s “Much Ado
about Nothing” belong in the current volume. In any case, Chwe does not
mention that Austen probably knew “Much Ado about Nothing” well and
some of her characters show parallels with Shakespeare’s protagonists (as
argued by Harris 2011, 44).
• It is a pity that Chwe does not give any hints on how modern game theo-
rists nowdays deal with Austen’s innovations or how these might be taken
up in the future.
• Chwe uses chapter 5 to familiarize the reader with the six novels. The
reader would have appreciated relationship diagrams for the six novels.
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y later’ should be very helpful to summarize and remember the main
threads.
• Sometimes, Chwe exaggerates the strategic abilities of Austen’s charac-
ters. For example, he claims (69) that Northanger Abbey’s Catherine read-
ily retorts John Thorpe’s allusion to their common future (see Austen 2000,
vol. I, chapter XV, 84) while it becomes very clear later that Catherine just
did not understand John’s intentions (see Austen 2000, vol. II, chapter III,
99). Indeed, John’s sister Isabella exclaims: “His attentions were such
that a child must have noticed.”
7. Summary
Michael Suk-Young Chwe has written a book worth reading. You may be an
Austen enthusiast who likes a new outlook on your favorite author. Read the
book and do not be afraid of game theory. Chwe explains it well to beginners.
You may be an economist or a political scientist. Then you will also proﬁtably
read this book. You may remember some interesting examples, enjoy Chwe’s
thoughtful discussion of game theory, or work on Austen’s innovations. Chwe’s
book may inspire game theorists to read one or two Austen novels. A ﬁnal word
of warning to students facing game-theory exams: Reading Austen is not a sub-
stitute for ‘proper’ game theory textbooks (with deﬁnitions of Nash equilibria
etc.).
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